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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances, the gar-
nishee could have protected itself in two ways: by depositing
the money into the registry of the court, and provoking a con-
cursus proceeding so as to implead all interested parties; or by
proceeding as it did, in which case plaintiff would be required
to bring these interested parties into the garnishment proceed-
ings for the purpose of having their rights determined. The case,
however, was remanded to the trial court, with instructions to
permit plaintiff to cite all interested parties.
Evidence
George W. Pugh*
As might well be expected, numerous points of evidence
were presented to and decided by the Supreme Court during
the past year. For obvious reasons only the most interesting
and most significant will be discussed here.
RISK OF UNDUE PERSUASION-PHOTOGRAPHS OF DECEASED
In 1947 the Supreme Court stated in State v. Morgan1 that
on the retrial of that case, certain gruesome or ghastly pictures
of the deceased victim should be excluded-"unless the State
shows some necessary purpose for the introduction of the pho-
tographs in evidence. '2 The photographs in question had been
presented for the alleged purpose of proving the corpus delicti,
and the nature, scope and extent of the wounds received by
deceased. Ample testimony had already been introduced as to
these matters, and the Supreme Court understandably feared
that the admission of the photographs might disturb the jury
in its deliberations.
Sound judicial administration demands that the trial court
exercise broad discretion in its control of a trial, but, of course,
it must be ever alert to protect a litigant from a decision dic-
tated by emotion rather than reason. Both legislative acts and
appellate decisions should provide trial courts with criteria for
the exercise of this discretion. The guiding rule of State v.
* Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 211 La. 572, 30 So. 2d 434 (1947), noted in 22 Tulane L. Rev. 327 (1947).
2. 211 La. 572, 579, 30 So. 2d 434, 436.
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Morgan seemed to be that gruesome photographs of the deceased
should be excluded if they are of little or no probative value
and involve a substantial risk of undue persuasion. There is
nothing unusual about such a rule. It is but the specific applica-
tion of the balancing process that has played a great part in the
formulation of many of our. rules of evidence.
Two cases 3 decided during the past year seem to reduce
greatly the force of this phase of State v. Morgan. In State v.
Solomon,4 the court found that two of the three photographs
admitted in evidence were not in fact gruesome. The third
photograph was "of the face and head of the dead man showing
his gagged mouth and the gaping head wounds inflicted by
appellant." This, the court conceded, was "inelegant, '6 but
stated that "all murders, and especially those of the violent
type are revolting to the senses."7 The jurors, the court felt,
had been fully prepared to see and hear unpleasant things by
the opening statement of the district attorney, and were no
more affected by seeing the photographs than by "hearing a
recitation of the facts of appellant's shocking misdeed. '8 Thus
the court apparently rejects the current notion that this type
of demonstrative evidence generally carries great weight with
jurors. In distinguishing the Morgan case, the court in the Solo-
mon case discloses circumstances not discussed in the earlier
opinion. In this latter case the court said that the circumstances
in the Morgan case were so extreme that "the court was able
to draw the conclusion that it was offered solely for the pur-
pose of prejudicing the jury against the defendant."9  In the
Solomon case, the court found that "the photograph was clearly
admissible for identification purposes and also in corroboration
of the Coroner's proc~s verbal with reference to the description
of the wounds and the cause of death," 10 and concluded that
"State v. Morgan is to be regarded as-indeed it is-a case of
most unusual circumstances."11
3. State v. Solomon, 222 La. 269, 62 So. 2d 481 (1952) and State v. Mc-
Mullan, 66 So. 2d 574 (La. 1953). For an earlier opinion discussing the appli-
cation of the Morgan case, see State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So. 2d 496
(1950).
4. 222 La. 269, 62 So. 2d 481 (1952).
5. 222 La. 269, 277, 62 So. 2d 481, 483.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. 222 La. 269, 278, 62 So. 2d 481, 484.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
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The effect of the Morgan opinion was further reduced by
the decision in State v. McMullan.1 2 Defendant was charged
with the fatal shooting of a town official who had come to
McMullan's home for the purpose of quieting the irate defen-
dant. McMullan used the defense that the shooting was acci-
dental. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial court
permitted the coroner to project upon a screen three color slides
that he had taken of the deceased lying on the bloodstained
floor. The Supreme Court sustained the decision of the trial
judge, stating that one answer to defense counsel's objection
was that the scene portrayed was not "so gruesome or revolting
as to incite the emotions of the jury against the appellant."1
The court restated what had been said in the Solomon case-
that "all pictures of death by violence are inelegant and un-
pleasant"1 4 -and then added that "this does not mean that they
should be withheld from the jury's view even though they are
merely cumulative evidence."' 5 (Italics supplied.) And it reiter-
ated the State v. Solomon characterization of State v. Morgan
as "a case of most unusual circumstances." '16
These recent cases do not necessarily indicate an abandon-
ment of State v. Morgan. That case remains available as a basis
for relief in an exceptional case. But its applicability is appar-
ently much less extensive than might be gathered from simply
reading the opinion.
It seems to the writer that the balancing test implied by
State v. Morgan is eminently sound. Certainly where a photo-
graph is important evidence for the establishment of a disputed
point, it should be admitted, even though it presents a grue-
some spectacle, for here the probative value of the evidence
would outweigh the risk of possible undue persuasion. But where
the evidence is merely cumulative in nature, and is relevant
only as to an undisputed fact (as for example corpus delicti
in the McMullan case), then it would seem only fair to exclude
the evidence because of the possible undue persuasive effect it
might have upon the jury. The McMullan decision seems to
represent an open invitation to coroners to take kodachrome
pictures of all violent deaths. Such pictures would at least be
12. 66 So. 2d 574 (La. 1953). A Note on this case is planned for the
next issue of this REIw.
13. Id. at 575.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. See p. 221 supra.
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cumulative evidence of corpus delicti. Apparently under the
McMullan case, these pictures would normally be admitted, if
properly authenticated, even where the fact of death is undis-
puted. That such a practice might become prevalent would
seem indeed unfortunate.
WITNESSES-RIGHT OF DEFENDANT TO CALL Co-DEFENDANT
AS WITNESS
Does a defendant who has obtained a severance have the
right to call to the stand a person charged in the same bill of
information with the same offense? In State v. Gambino,' the
court answered in the affirmative, 8 and decided, too, that the
failure to accord the defendant this right constituted reversible
error. This in no way means that the party called to the stand
will be denied his privilege against self incrimination, for the
witness may assert his privilege and refuse to answer any ques-
tion where the answer thereto might tend to incriminate him.
Nevertheless defendant Gambino had the right to have the wit-
ness sworn.
WITNESSES-IMPEACEM T
In State v. Rocco, 9 the Supreme Court in footnote restated
the rule that "where impeaching evidence is received, 20 it
becomes the duty of the judge to caution the jury that such
evidence should not be considered as proof of defendant's
guilt."21 It indicated, however, that this rule is not applicable
where the defendant is the witness being impeached. In the
body of the opinion the court stated that the impeaching ma-
terial involved in the instant case could have been introduced
on the state's case in chief "provided that it was mentioned in
the opening statement.'2 2 (Italics supplied.) Thus the apparent
17. 221 La. 1039, 61 So. 2d 732 (1952).
18. For other cases indicating same rule, see State v. Pace, 183 La.
838, 165 So. 6 (1935); State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So. 2d 305 (1945).
19. 222 La. 177, 62 So. 2d 265 (1952).
20. It is somewhat difficult to understand upon what theory the ma-
terial in question (a letter written by the defendant) was considered im-
peaching evidence. It does not appear to have been properly admitted
as a prior inconsistent statement since defendant admitted his authorship
of the letter. See Art. 493, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950,
15:493.
21. 222 La. 177, 183, n. 3, 62 So. 2d 265, 267, n. 3 (1952). As authority
for this rule the court cited State v. Reed, 49 La. Ann. 704, 21 So. 732
(1897) and State v. Paul, 203 La. 1033, 14 So. 2d 826 (1943).
22. 222 La. 177, 182, 62 So. 2d 265, 267 (1952).
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implication is that the rule concerning the contents of the open-
ing statement may be effectively circumvented where the evi-
dence in question is relevant to the impeachment of a defendant
who has taken the stand. As is recognized elsewhere in the opin-
ion this is certainly not the rule with respect to confessions, and
it may be questioned whether undue surprise may not result
from a broad uncritical application of the rule implied in the
footnote to the court's opinion.
Without much discussion, the court in State v. Boudreaux2s
adopted the majority rule24 that a defendant who has been
fully pardoned as to a prior conviction may nevertheless, if
he takes the stand, be asked whether or not he has ever been
convicted of a crime. In State v. Taylor,25 the court had used
very strong language indicating the great regenerative effect
of a full pardon, and had held that under the circumstances
of that case it was reversible error not to permit the defendant
to introduce evidence that he had been given a full executive
pardon. In the Boudreaux case, the court noted that here the
defendant had not been prevented from showing that he had
received a full pardon.
WITNESSES-PRIVILEGE
In State v. McMullan2 1 the defense counsel had informed
the district attorney and the judge on the day of the trial that
the wife of the defendant, an eyewitness of the shooting, de-
sired to exercise her privilege not to testify against her hus-
band. Nevertheless, the district attorney called the wife to the
stand, and the Supreme Court held that the lower court com-
mitted no error in forcing the wife to assert her privilege in
the presence of the jury. The problems that arise in connec-
tion with this phase of the husband-wife privilege are some-
what extensive in nature and will be discussed in some detail
in a subsequent issue of this REVIEW.27
23. 221 La. 1078, 61 So. 2d 878 (1952).
24. For short general discussion as to state of the jurisprudence on this
subject see Note, 25 Tulane L. Rev. 281 (1951).
25. 172 La. 20, 133 So. 349 (1931). For other Louisiana cases dealing
with the general effect of a full pardon, see State v. Baptiste, 26 La. Ann.
134 (1874) and State v. Lee, 171 La. 744, 132 So. 219 (1931).
26. 66 So. 2d 574 (La. 1953). For discussion as to another interesting
point raised in this case, see p. 222 supra.
27. See note 12 supra.
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OPINION TESTIMONY
A crucial point in State v. Cooper28 was whether the de-
ceased had been shot while sitting in his automobile, or while
advancing upon the defendant with a weapon obtained from
the car. Despite the requests of defense counsel, the jury was
never clearly instructed to disregard the unsolicited opinion
of the coroner that deceased had "fallen out of the door of his
automobile. '29 The coroner had not been an eyewitness to the
shooting and was not qualified to give an expert opinion as
to this point. The Supreme Court found that the substantial
rights of the defendant had been prejudiced, and properly set
aside defendant's conviction and sentence.
In State v. Robinson, 0 the lower court, over the objection
of defense counsel, had permitted a state trooper to give an
estimate as to the speed at which defendant was driving at
the time his truck collided with that of another. The trooper
had not been an eyewitness of the accident, but had arrived
at the scene about a half hour later. He testified that there had
been no skid or road marks, and based his estimate upon "the
force of the impact and the distance covered by both trucks
after the blow."2' 1 He stated that he had been a state trooper
for some twelve years and had had the schooling and experi-
ence that troopers usually have. The Supreme Court held on
rehearing 32 that the lower court had committed reversible error
in permitting the witness to give his opinion as to the speed
of the truck, for it found that "the proper foundation, required
by law as a condition precedent for the admission of the opin-
ion, was not laid"23 and that the district attorney had not ten-
dered the witness as an expert.
HEARSAY
In State v. Jackson,3 4 the court properly distinguished be-
tween fact of utterance and utterance of fact, and held that
no hearsay was involved where the coroner was permitted to
28. 66 So. 2d 336 (La. 1953).
29. 66 So. 2d 336, 337.
30. 66 So. 2d 515 (La. 1953).
31. 66 So. 2d 515, 516.
32. There was a vigorous dissent by Justice LeBlanc, who had written
the majority opinion of the court in the original hearing.
33. 66 So. 2d 515, 519.
34. 223 La. 435, 65 So. 2d 903 (1953).
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testify that the body on which he performed the autopsy bore
upon it an identification tag bearing the name of the alleged
deceased. The court said:
"There might have been merit to the objection had
the testimony sought to be brought out been offered for
the purpose of identifying the body as that of Frances Foster
merely because the tag which it bore had the name Foster
written on it. As the doctor admits he did not know who
had placed the tag on the body nor did he know who had
written the name "Frances Foster" on the tag. But he
certainly could testify that he saw such tag on the body
without that being hearsay testimony.
"When the testimony concerning the tag is considered
in connection with several other facts and circumstances
of the case, especially the one that it was known that
Frances Foster had been shot in the head the night before,
that it is the custom to attach an identifying tag to a corpse
that is taken to the morgue and that the body on which
Dr. McCormick performed his autopsy was the only one
on which an autopsy had been performed that day, we
believe that the testimony was relevant and was competent
proof of the corpus delicti in this case."' 5
ADMISSIONS
In State v. Roshto,38 the court followed its prior pronounce-
ments in State v. Aspara37 and State v. Hayes38 and held that
false exculpatory statements of an accused are admissible as
admissions.
EVIDENCE AS TO THE DANGEROUS CHARACTER OF THE
VICTIM IN A CRIMINAL CASE
State v. Terry39 is an excellent example of a case decided
under Article 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure40 prior
to the 1952 amendment. 41 In order to introduce evidence of
35. 65 So. 2d 903, 905-906.
36. 222 La. 185, 62 So. 2d 268 (1952).
37. 113 La. 940, 37 So. 883 (1904).
38. 162 La. 310, 110 So. 486 (1926).
39. 221 La. 1109, 61 So. 2d 888 (1952).
40. La. R.S. 1950, 15:482. For discussion of problems presented under
this article, see 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 377 (1940) and 10 Tulane L. Rev.
643 (1936).
41. La. Act 239 of 1952; La. R.S. Supp. 1952, 15:482.
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the victim's bad character or of his prior threats against the
accused, it was necessary first to prove to the trial court that
the victim had made a hostile demonstration or overt act
against accused. As is shown by the Terry case, the decision
on the question of whether the condition precedent to admis-
sibility was met was a matter resting largely within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge. Now, as a result of Act 239 of 1952,42
the requirements of the condition precedent to admissibility
have been substantially reduced. 43
State v. Boudreaux 4 properly holds that evidence of a
prior conviction is inadmissible to show the bad character of
the victim, for "character, whether good or bad, depends upon
the general reputation that a man has among his neighbors. '
.45
It is quite true that Article 49546 permits the impeachment of
a witness by a showing of prior convictions, but the impeach-
ment of a witness is something totally different from the show-
ing of the bad character of the victim. In one the question is
credibility, in the other the question is whether or not the
defendant reasonably apprehended himself to be in danger,
or whether he or the victim was in fact the aggressor.
In State v. McMillian,47 defendant was charged with mur-
dering her husband. She pleaded self-defense and after intro-
ducing evidence showing that deceased was intoxicated at the
time of the homicide, she attempted to show that when de-
ceased had been drunk on past occasions he had "brutally mis-
treated"48 her. The court conceded that evidence of prior rela-
tions between the parties was inadmissible to show dangerous
character of the deceased, but held that
"under the plea of self-defense such evidence was admis-
sible and relevant to show the reasonableness of the de-
fendant's fear of an impending attack or of suffering great
42. La. R.S. Supp. 1952, 15:482.
43. As amended, Article 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928
reads as follows: "In the absence of evidence of hostile demonstration or
of overt act on the part of the person slain or injured, evidence of his
dangerous character or of his threats against accused is not admissible."
(Italics supplied.)
Prior to the 1952 amendment, the word evidence read proof.
44. 221 La. 1078, 61 So. 2d 878 (1952). For a discussion of another in-
teresting point raised in this case, see notes 23 and 24 supra, and accom-
panying text.
45. Art. 479, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:479.
46. La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. Supp. 1952, 15:495.
47. 223 La. 96, 64 So. 2d 856 (1953).
48. 64 So. 2d 856.
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bodily harm at the time of the homicide. It would have
tended to negative intent and was thus relevant and admis-
sible under Article 441 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which provides: 'Relevant evidence is that tending * * to
negative the commission of the offense and the intent.' ",41
Criminal Law and Procedure
CRIMINAL LAW
Dale E. Bennett*
CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF FAMILY
Criminal Neglect of Family is defined in Article 74 of the
Criminal Code' as "the desertion or intentional non-support" of
a wife or "minor child" who is in necessitous circumstances. In
State v. Woods2 the court properly held that the term "minor
child" meant any child under twenty-one years of age, and
hence applied to a high school senior who had passed his seven-
teenth birthday. However, we may pause to question the court's
further holding that "the earnings of the father are not an
essential element of the crime of neglect of family," and that
"the father's duty to support is absolute. His failure to do so
constituted the offense."3 Since Article 74 requires the "inten-
tional" non-support, it would appear that a father who is finan-
cially unable to furnish such support should at least have an
affirmative defense. A normal construction of the language
employed in the statutory definition would only justify its
application to the parent who is able to furnish support and
wilfully refuses to do so. Possibly all the court means to hold
is that the state establishes its case by showing that the child
is in necessitous circumstances as a result of the parent's failure
to furnish proper support, and that the affirmative defense of
inability to furnish such support must be urged and proven
by the defense, just as reasonable mistake of fact and other
49. Id. at 857.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. R.S. 1950, 14:74.
2. 66 So. 2d 315 (La. 1953).
3. Justice Moise, id. at 317.
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